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CASES NOTED
Had the intention been otherwise Congress would not have failed to state
the determinative date. The court finds little to fear from the results of
non-apprehension of an offender until many years after the violation since
by the Federal Act crimes involving capital punishment or life imprisonment
are excluded,23 and a large portion of other offenses would be barred by the
three year Statute of LimitationsY2 In addition, the Act clearly places it
within the discretion of the Attorney-General as to whether the offender
should be proceeded against as a juvenile.2 5  The reasonable assumption is
that he would do so in a proper case. To construe the statute otherwise, the
court finds, might allow the indictment or trial to be delayed to the prejudice
of the offender thereby nullifying the purpose of the Act; that is, the recog-
nition that one under eighteen years of age does not have mature judgment
and should not be compelled to bear the criminal stigma all his life due to a
youthful violation.
The analysis of the problem presented in the instant case follows closely
the basic purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, a purpose of reform
rather than punishment, and the recognition that a juvenile offense remains
just that regardless of the passage of time. Revision of the Juvenile Acts
in conformity with those statutes which change the common law,20 making
a juvenile offense delinquency and not a crime, would enlighten and further
the true purpose of the Acts.
INSURANCE - CONSTRUCTION OF WAR EXCLUSION
CLAUSE - KOREAN ACTION
Action to recover on a life insurance policy which provided for the pay-
ment of double indemnity for accidental death except if insured was engaged
in military, air or naval services in time of war. Held, the Korean action is
at most an undeclared war. Since the tenn "war" is ambiguous, the policy
must be construed in favor of the insured. Harding v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 90 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1952).'
The exemption clause used in this policy depends not only upon the
status of the individual, but also upon the status of the country when death
occurred. Where such a clause is used, merely "entering into" military
service in time of war is sufficient to terminate the double indemnity provi-
23. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1951).
24. 62 STAT. 828 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1951) (does not run on capital offenses).
25. 62 STAT. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1951), Barnes v. Pescor, 68 F. Supp.
127 (W.D. Mo. 1946), appeal dismissed 158 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1946).
26. N.Y. Dom. REL. Cr. AcT. § 61.
1. See also Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1952) (de-
cided on the same day).
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sion, 2 as distinguished from "result" clauses where death must be "caused
by" military duties in time of war.3
It is well settled that war in its legal sense can never exist without the
concurrence of the political departments of the government having the war-
making power, 4 and that the power to declare war is fixed solely in Con-
gress.5 A nation may prosecute its rights by force without either notice or a
formal declaration of war,6 and the distinction between declared and unde-
clared war has long been recognized7 Until there has been some act or
declaration creating or recognizing its existence by a department clothed with
the war-making power, there can be no war of which a court can take judicial
notice.8 Thus, in cases arising out of the attack on Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, it was held that war did not exist until recognized by the formal
declaration by Congress on December 8, 1941.0
The instant case is apparently the first reported adjudication on the spe-
cific question of whether or not the hostilities in Korea constitute a war of
which the courts must take judicial notice. The court did not depart from
the well established rule of looking to the political departments of the gov-
ernment for the determination of a state of war. Nowhere did they find any
act of those departments establishing or recognizing the hostilities as any-
thing other than an "Action in Korea"'1 to which our forces have been com-
mitted under the authority of the United Nations Charter.11 The court rea-
2. State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harmon, 72 Ga. App. 117, 33 S.E. 2d 105 (1945);
Wolford v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 162 Pa. Super. 249, 57 A.2d 581 (1948).
3. Seleneck, Adm'r v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 160 Pa. Super. 242, 50 A.2d
736 (1947); Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 204 S.C. 193, 28 S.E.2d 808 (1944).
4. Prize Cases," 2 Black 635 (U.S. 1862) (Congress having no power to declare
war against a State, the Civil War is the only instance where the courts have looked to
the President for a political determination of a state of war); People v. McCloyd, I Hill
(N.Y.) 377, 407, 25 Wend. 483(1841).
5. U. S. CoNsT. ART. 1, § 8; Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6. In re Wulzen, 235 Fed. 362 (S.D. Ohio 1916); Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136
Fed. 445 (C.C.D. Kan. 1905); The Parkhill, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,755a (E.D. Pa. 1861);
Verano v. DeAngelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1941); Stephen Bishop v.
Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 295 (1866).
7. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948); Bas v. Tingy,
4 Dall 37 (1800).
8. Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944);
Verano v. DeAngelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1941); In re Wulzen, 235 Fed.
362 (S.D. Ohio 1916); Fehn v. Shaw, 201 Ga. 517, 40 S.E.2d 547 (1946); Pang v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaii 208 (1945); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n,
65 Idaho 408, '145 P.2d 227 (1944); Janco v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston,
Mass., 160 Pa. Super. 230, 50 A.2d 695 (1947); West v. Palnetto State Life Ins. Co.,
202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943); Stephen Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex. 296
(1866).
9. Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944);
Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaii 208 (1945); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut.
Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944; West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co.,
202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943). But cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158
F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
10. See Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 28, 82d Cong.; Pub.
L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., § 202, (1951) 26 U.S.C. § 22(b), (13) (Supp. 1946).
11. United Nations Charter Article 39, "The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or aggrssion, and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken . .. to restore international peace and
CASES NOTED
soned that even if the action in Korea should be found to be a war, it is at
most an undeclared war. If the defendant insurance company intended the
term "war" to include undeclared war its intentions should have been made
clear in unambiguous terms. This has been done 2 by other insurance com-
panies since the "Pearl Harbor Cases."'3
Not being concerned with the actualities of the hostilities in Korea, the
court's conclusion that they do not constitute a war seems to be well sup-
ported. The case also serves to emphasize that where private parties have
occasion to contract with reference to war, the term "war" will be construed
in its legal sense unless the parties give it some other definition or meaning
by contract.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-LIABILITY OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
TO COUNTERCLAIM IN FEDERAL COURTS
Defendants counterclaimed in a United States District Court for libel.
Plaintiffs, a foreign nation, moved to have the counterclaim dismissed, assert-
ing sovereign immunity. Held, a counterclaim not arising out of the same
transaction would be dismissed. Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 105
F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952).
Until the early eighteenth century no offset of one debt against another
was allowed unless the debts were mutually connected.' In the latter part
of the eighteenth century a right of set-off in bankruptcy was allowed to
abolish certain injustices.2 Subsequently, statutes pertaining to set-off were
enacted governing the right to counterclaim in any suit.3  These statutes
tended to confuse the federal courts who failed to distinguish counterclaim,
recoupment and set-off.
4
Recoupment and set-off are derived from the English common and
statutory law whereas counterclaim is purely of code origin. Recoupment
arose out of the same transaction which formed the basis of the plaintiff's
security." (Under the authority of this article the Security Council resolution of June
27, 1950 recommended "that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore interna.
tional peace and security in the area."); Vol. XXIII, No. 574 Dep't State Bull. 5 (July
3, 1950) (the President's action seeks to accomplish the objective of the Security Council
resolution).
12. Stinson vI. New York Life Ins. Co,, 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948).
13. See note 9 supra.
1. 78 IR L.T. 93 (1944); 26 HIaRv. L. REV. 490 (Supp. 1932).
2. STAT. 4 & 5 AmE. c. 4 (1705); STAT. 5 GEO. 1, c. 24 (1718); STAT. 5 GEo. 2,
c. 30 (1731).
3. CoM. LAW PROCEDURE ACT § 83 (17 & 18 VICT. C. 125) (1854); In re Cross,
265 Fed. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1920); Bankers v. Jarvis, 1 K.B. 549 (1903); 29 HALSBUBY S
LAws OF EN. 482 n. (u) (2d 1938).
4. 25 MINN. L. REV. 801 (1940); 26 A.J. INT. L. 493 (Supp. 1939).
5. JUDICATURE ACT § 24 (1873); 2 GEo. II c. 22 (1728); Curtis-Warner Corp. v.
Thirkettle, 99 N.J. 806, 134 Atl. 299 (1926); HALSaURY'S LAws, supr note 4.
